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Banishing Colonial Specters: Language
Ideology and Education Policy in Pakistan
Mariam Durrani
University of Pennsylvania
This paper examines the presence of British colonial language ideologies in Pakistan’s
language-in-education policy and discourses. Through a review of scholarly work on official
language policies, and a sampling of current policies and media commentary, I analyze
how the language ideologies that undergird the language-in-education discourses are
embedded with political, cultural, and moral projects about speakers and their languages.
The colonial language ideologies had assumed a direct relationship between a language
and the stereotypic characteristics of its speakers and failed to account for the multiple
possibilities that the English medium education provided for the indigenous population,
eventually leading to decolonization. In Pakistan’s post-independence education system,
the positioning of English as a prestige language variety in contrast to the vernacular
languages continues to have important consequences within Pakistan’s current domestic
and global political context. By recognizing how top-down colonial policies failed to
account for the resistance efforts of English-speaking Indians, I argue that current
language-in-education policies for political and governmental purposes may continue
to be counterproductive unless they take local knowledges and realities into account.

I

f it is true that there is “no view from nowhere” when it comes to ideas about
language (Irvine & Gal, 2009), then what is the position of Pakistan’s current
language-in-education policy discourse with respect to its colonial history and
multilingual context? Furthermore what can we learn from the history of policies
and programs that will contribute to the language-in-education dialogue so that
the educational system is not destined to repeat its past? In this essay, I examine
colonial and post-independence language-in-education policies in Pakistan,
paying special attention to the overlapping of colonial and nationalist language
ideologies, and analyze how these continue to impact Pakistan’s current language
in education policies. By recognizing how top-down colonial policies failed to
account for the resistance efforts of English-speaking Indians1, I argue that current
language-in-education policies for political and governmental purposes may
continue to be counterproductive unless they take local knowledges and realities
into account.
My discussion must be selective given the enormous breadth of the topic and
the limited length of this work. I hope, however, that the arguments presented
will have relevance to language policy discourse beyond the paper’s scope. As
part of my theoretical framework, I use the analytical concepts of language ideology
and discourse. Language ideology is defined as “ideas with which participants
1

Prior to 1947, the nations now knows as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India constituted one country
recognized as India. My reference to English-speaking Indians indexes the English-speaking segment
of this pre-1947 Indian population.
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and observers frame their understanding of linguistic varieties and map those
understandings onto people, events, and activities that are significant to them”
(Irvine & Gal, 2009, p. 402), and serves as a useful tool to examine the current
debates, or discourses, regarding the medium of instruction (MOI) in Pakistan’s
education system. According to Blommaert (2005), discourse consists of “all forms
of meaningful semiotic human activity seen in connection with social, cultural,
historical patterns and developments of use” (p. 3). The historic debates regarding
MOI and the related language ideologies held by multiple stakeholders can be
most aptly understood to constitute multiple discourses on MOI in Pakistan. He
goes on to explain that any discourse, and also any policy, has a range of socially
significant attributes and associated ideologies. While it is inconceivable that we
can fashion a language policy without ideologies, it is imperative that we become
more critically conscious of the ideologies that have informed previous language
policies and ensure that we cease the perpetuation of language policies informed
by colonial-era, and thus colonizing, discourses. Rather we must understand
contemporary language practices of teachers, students, and families and then
it may be possible to propose more contextually appropriate and empiricallygrounded language policies based on these practices. After all, languages are only
useful insofar as people find them suitable for their communicative needs and
language policy discourse should recognize this reality.
Through a review of scholarly work on official language policies, and a
sampling of current policies and media commentary, I analyze how the language
ideologies that undergird the language-in-education discourses are embedded
with political, cultural, and moral projects about speakers and their languages. This
paper examines specific official language policy and language policy discourses
created by researchers, journalists, and other public figures, and considers the
language ideologies that continue to inform these discourses. One can begin this
exploration into Pakistan’s language policies at the country’s inception in 1947, but
in order to understand the language policy enacted at Pakistan’s independence, it
is helpful to turn to the earlier British colonial policies in India. After analyzing
colonial and independence-era language in education policy, the paper turns to
current policy initiatives and discourses. Finally I discuss on-going efforts to create
more effective policies and the primacy of ethnographic research in this process.
The Colonial Moment and Language Policies
Prior to 1784, the East India Company’s language policies were relatively
tolerant since the then-purpose was to conduct trade peacefully and profitably with
the indigenous Indian people.2 In fact, during the late 18th century, the University
of Oxford established a professorship of Persian Studies, the official language of
the Mughal Empire’s administration, for the “cultivation of the Persian tongue, as
an useful attainment in such persons as are designed for the service of the EastIndia company [sic]” (Rahman, [circa 18C] 2004a, p. 6). The Orientalists in the
Company’s leadership favored indigenization as a means of governance (Ayres,
2

As noted, the areas now known as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India were identified under one name
‘India’ and as one colony in the British Empire. In this paper, I follow the languages of Pakistan (Urdu,
English, regional languages) more closely. Due to this scope, Hindi, Sanskrit, and other languages will
not be included in the analysis.

30

Banishing Colonial Specters
2009; Viswanathan, 1989). Viswanathan (1989) explains that the British sensed that
an “efficient Indian administration rested on an understanding of Indian culture”
(p. 28), and so it was not uncommon for many early Company men to learn local
languages, marry local Indian women, and even convert to local religions. The
1784 Pitt’s India Act changed the linguistic preference of the administrators when
the Company came under the control of the British crown, thereafter espousing
a more Anglicist policy. With the passage of Bentinck’s English Education Act in
1835, English became the colonial system’s medium of instruction, “endorsing a
new function and purpose for English instruction in the dissemination of moral
and religious values” (p. 44). In the oft-cited Minute on Indian Education ([1835]
n.d.), Macaulay, a proponent of Anglicist policies, argued that due to the costs
of maintaining both vernacular and English systems of education in India, the
Crown must choose English, emphasizing the priority of good governance over
cultivation of indigenous languages and customs. Macaulay explained:
I feel...that it is impossible for us, with our limited means, to attempt to
educate the body of the people. We must at present do our best to form
a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we
govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in
opinions, in morals, and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine
the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms
of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to render them
by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the
population. ([1835] n.d., n. p., emphasis added)

This policy to divide the Indian population into two classes—one who serve as
interpreters, and the “millions”—manifested in two media of instruction: English
for the elite and non-English for the larger population due to “limited means.” In
the same Minute, he expresses his interest to “strike at the root of the bad system,”
by ceasing the publication of Arabic and Sanskrit books and closing religious
schools of learning. Here, we see how Macaulay’s language ideology about
indigenous languages negates Indian religious texts and learning, specifically
referencing Arabic, a stand-in word for Islam, and Sanskrit, for Hinduism. If the
roots of the bad system were expunged through the removal of texts and religious
education, the British could then replace them with a colonial and missionary
education in English. It is noteworthy that although Macaulay nowhere mentions
Persian in his Minute, the 1835 English Education Act and the Crown’s focus
on English for official and administrative communication ousted Persian, the
official and courtly language of the Mughal empire, from all administrative and
educational functions (Rahman, 2011). Once Persian was strategically removed,
as an attempt to eradicate Mughal symbols of power, the colonizers maintained
English as the official language for colonial administrative functions3. Since British
3

The Hindustani language, which preceded Hindi and Urdu, became a sort of cosmopolitan lingua
franca within the northern and western regions of the British empire (Metcalf & Metcalf, 2006; Rahman, 2011). For this reason, 19th century scholars, some employed by the East-India Company, regularly
published detailed grammars on the Hindustani language (Eastwick, 1858; Forbes, 1861). While there
are many other languages spoken in the formerly colonized area now known as Pakistan and India, the
priority assigned to Hindustani, now Urdu and Hindi, demonstrates the usefulness it held for colonial
administrators who wished to communicate more effectively with the local Indians. Today, Urdu and
Hindi are recognized as two separate languages based on two orthographic systems, lexical differ-
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moral and intellectual superiority was not questioned by the colonial officers, their
mission to create a class of interpreters, Indian only in blood and color, would
continue unabated. As history has shown, this strategic colonizing mission would
eventually be thwarted by many of the same interpreters (Metcalf & Metcalf, 2006),
which will be discussed later in the paper.
Through this selected analysis of colonial language education policy, we can
identify two emergent language ideologies. The first ideology divides Indians into
two linguistically-defined classes—the interpreter class of English speakers and
the millions who are not English speakers; and the second ideology assumes that
if Indians learn English, they will behave more like British citizens and support
the Crown, thereby equating language, thought, and behavior. Echoing Macaulay,
Rahman (2002) explains that due to limited resources an English medium education
remained an elite privilege, and the British supported a policy of vernacular
education for the masses up until independence. This division of English-medium
and vernacular-medium schooling has remained a defining characteristic of
education in Pakistan, and arguably even within the larger subcontinent. Rahman
(2004b) explains that there were two kinds of English-medium schools under
British rule: Chiefs’ Colleges and English schools. Both were designed for political
and social purposes, i.e., to encourage loyalty to the Crown and to create a class
of civil service employees that constituted the newly emerging professional upper
middle class, and separated from the vernacular-speaking masses.
The prioritization of secular governance and the creation of an intermediary
class indexes the second language ideology which emerges from colonialist
language policies. According to Anglicist thought, if Indians learned to speak
English and follow the associated cultural traditions, they would think more
like the native English speakers and remain loyal to the Crown. The colonial
policymakers imagined a “rational” directionality from language learning and
thought to political allegiance and agentive action. The initial Muslim reaction
to English education follows a similar ideological position, exemplified by the
famous religious edict, or fatwa, of Shah Abdul Aziz (1746–1823) in which he
states that there is nothing inherently wrong with Muslims learning English as
long as it is not for the purpose of flattering the English or gaining their favor
(Rahman, 2002).4 While Aziz’s fatwa could be interpreted as a rhetorically
ambiguous statement, many Muslim families saw it as a clear instruction not
to send their sons to study English; after all, in the late 18th century, there was
little else to do with the English language in the Indian subcontinent other than
to work under the supervision of colonial officers. Similar to the British belief
that learning English would have moral and religious implications, the Muslim
scholars also understood English learning to have a pre-determined communicative
functionality. For example, some, like Aziz, argued that it would lead to a less
cohesive Muslim community. This leads to an important ideological position
where English education was adopted as a colonial strategy to enhance national
unity and successful governance. In other words, students of English were not
expected to demand independence.

32

ences, and cultural references (Rahman, 2011; Rai, 1984).
4
The initial Muslim reaction acknowledges an early understanding of the multiple possibilities of
English usage. Later I will discuss the emergence of multiple varieties of English in Pakistan (for
more on Pakistani English see Baumgardner, 1993; for more on English as an Islamic language, see
Mahboob, 2009).
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We can see a link between the second language ideology and a long tradition in
European philosophical thought which has recently been examined and critiqued
by sociolinguist Jan Blommaert (2005). He explains that German Romantic thinker
Johann Gottfried Herder appropriated John Locke’s enlightenment principles that
assumed a shared language indexes a shared culture among its speakers. Along the
same lines, Hymes (1974) argues that the Herderian approaches separate languages
from their socially situated use, equate the stereotypic characteristics of a given
speech community with the language itself, and assume the social functions of a
language to be given and universally equivalent. For example, if a Muslim person
learns Hindi, the learning act may index or position her as a Hindu sympathizer. In
this sense, language learning as a practice becomes emblematic and “sets defaults
for subsequent readings of personhood” (Agha, 2007, p. 252-253).
Macaulay’s statement designates English as the language of science and
conveyor of knowledge, a task for which the vernacular languages were deemed
unfit. Later in this paper, I expound on how the denigrating and negative ideologies
ascribed to vernacular languages remain a specter of Indian colonial heritage. In
both the colonial moment and in post-1947 Pakistan, the notion of a single language
and its associated speech community and the simple language-equals-people
equation fail to capture the dynamic nature of human communication both within
a singular speech community and between communities (Ayres, 2009; Blommaert,
2005; Hymes, 1974).
The Crown’s hope for a passive acceptance of English rule, as well as the English
language, was short-sighted. In 1857 Indian sepoys, or soldiers in the colonial
army, led a major uprising also known as the First War of Independence. This
rebellion is considered to be a major turning point in the British colonial presence
in India (Metcalf & Metcalf, 2006). The Sepoy Uprising was but the beginning of a
long struggle for independence for India and Pakistan. Despite British maneuvers
to delegitimate Mughal rule, including replacing Persian with English as the new
official language, the desire for Indian independence was certainly not dependent
on the medium of communication. How can we understand the possible reasons
why, despite the British belief in their colonial project and strategic Anglicization
of the education system, they were ultimately unable to avoid indigenous calls for
independence? Despite the attempt to create “a class of persons...English in taste,
in opinions, in morals, and in intellect” (Macaulay, [1835] n.d.), it is clear that that
the indigenous did not remain Indian only by blood and color. The Indian National
Congress5 convened in 1885 by a group of some seventy English-educated Indians
to acquire more legal standing in the colonial government (Metcalf & Metcalf,
2006). These Indians attended the very same elite, English-medium schools and
universities that Macaulay had proposed, and many also went to London to study
for the bar or the Civil Service. Metcalf and Metcalf (2006) explain that the initial
cohesion of the Congress was based on these shared interests and educational
experiences. As Bhabha (1994) would argue, the class of interpreters were “partobjects of a metonymy of colonial desire...[who] emerge as ‘inappropriate’ colonial
subjects” (p. 126, emphasis added). The inappropriateness of these agents led to
the destabilization of the colonial subjectivity and altered the colonial master’s
5

The INC (founded in 1884) was one of the most famous political parties in India. The history of INC
presidents includes many illustrious Indian politicians including Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal
Nehru (Metcalf & Metcalf, 2006). The INC-led coalition won the 2009 Indian elections.
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authoritative centrality (Ben Beya, n. d.). Bhabha’s theoretical contribution on
colonial ambivalence helps illuminate how the Herderian, one nation-one language
ideology and a top-down understanding of language instruction cannot adequately
account for the ways that individuals learn and trope on language use for their
own purposes (cf. Agha, 2007). In other words, while the British fervently hoped
that an English education would remove the indigenous population’s hopes for
independence, it can be argued that this very education significantly contributed
to the ultimate passing of the Indian Independence Act by the British parliament
in 1947. The Indian National Congress became “the focus of the longest-lived
nationalist movement in the modern colonial world, [and]...was the model for
nationalist movements elsewhere” (Metcalf & Metcalf, 2006, p. 136). It appears that
the same interpreter class, or Macaulay’s translators, learned to use the discursive
tools of the master, here English, and the socializing opportunities provided by
its learning to protest the colonizer’s domination (Bhabha, 1994). Bhabha’s (1994)
theory on mimicry and colonial ambivalence situates the subversive nature and
consequences to English-medium education for the elite interpreter class. Once
indigenous English speakers began not only flattering the British in English but
also communicating with each other (in both English and vernacular languages),
we can see how the very colonial education designed to create a class of Indians
who would resemble the British became more of a “menace,” leading to colonial
rupture and not colonial solidarity (p. 126).
Here we see an instance of how a top-down, colonial language policy and
its associated language ideologies may have actually backfired since the local
contexts and actors were not understood or included in the policy-making process.
The British were surely unaware of the private conversations between Indian expatriates studying in London, but it appears these private moments accumulated
and transformed into a forum to express political desires, leading to the Indian
independence movement.
Recycling Colonial Language Ideologies after Independence
The Indian Muslim leaders were working alongside their Hindu counterparts
in the Indian National Congress (INC) to attain independence for India as
one undivided nation (Jalal, 1985). Prior to August 1947, the Muslim faction had
envisioned an India that would have included Pakistan and Bangladesh in a single
nation-state. Early that year, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, also known as the founder
of Pakistan, proposed the possibility of a homeland for Indian Muslims to the
INC as a bargaining strategy, in order to obtain more political rights and power
for Muslims in an undivided India. When this strategy did not yield the desired
results and the Congress Party did not acquiesce to the Muslim League’s demands
in the years before Independence, Pakistan was forged into existence through the
violent and traumatic Partition from India (Jalal, 1985). As a result, Pakistan’s early
nationalist identity was positioned as counter to Indian nationalist identity. This
division was evident in the language ideologies that Indian Muslim nationalists
and Indian Hindu nationalists ascribed to their respective languages (for more on
the Hindi public sphere, see Orsini, 2002). The status of Urdu as the Indian Muslim
language became part of the rallying cry for an independent Muslim state (Ayres,
2009; Rai, 1984). Rahman (2002) explains that Muslim scholars came to see Urdu as
34
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an Islamic language and that “one of the major changes in Muslim consciousness...
was because of the adoption of print by the Indian ulema [or Indian Muslim
scholars]” (p. 220). The increasing popularity of Urdu print became part of the
Muslim leaders’ political strategy to communicate and garner support within their
communities. In this case Urdu language practices, specifically the use of Nastiliq
script which is aesthetically similar to the same script found in the Quran, leads to
an ideology of Urdu being seen as more emblematic of Islam and being Muslim;
while the same grammatical system when written in the Devanagari script, or
the script used for Sanskrit and Hindu texts, is thought to be a Hindu emblem.
Rahman (2011) explicates the shared history of Urdu and Hindi and discusses
how the processes of Sanskritization for Hindi and Arabization for Urdu became
indexical markers for contrasting religious identities. These religious affiliations
have continued to inform the language ideologies of both Hindi and Urdu6. The
premise of Pakistan’s independence, as a homeland for Indian Muslims7, hinged
on its religious and linguistic difference from India. Ideologically speaking, the
post-1947 discourse of Urdu as a symbol for Indian-Muslim unity recycles the
earlier colonial ideologies where language indexes not only national unity but also
moral positionality (cf. Ayres, 2009; Rahman, 2002).
Between 1947 and 1971, Pakistan consisted of two regions—West Pakistan,
which is present-day Pakistan, and East Pakistan, which is present-day
Bangladesh—separated geographically by 1100 miles. Many of the nation-state’s
new leaders came from largely Urdu-speaking provinces and devised a language
policy based on a “project to forge a Pakistani ethnicity through the cultural heritage
of the Urdu language” (Ayres, 2009, p. 6). During a 1948 public meeting in Dhaka,
the capital of former East Pakistan and now present-day Bangladesh, Pakistan’s
founder Mohammed Ali Jinnah told the audience that, while the Bengali language
may well be the provincial language:
the State Language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language. Any one who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan.
Without one State language, no nation can remain tied up solidly together and function. (Jinnah, [1948] 2000, p.150)

Pakistani leaders’ emphasis on the role of a common language shares similar
epistemological assumptions as the Crown, namely that speakers of the same
speech community would consider themselves compatriots of a united nation
and therefore easier to govern through one state language (Ayres, 2009). This
statement also illustrates the development of Urdu as a linguistic emblem of
national identity and any identification of a non-Urdu language with Pakistan is
deemed a treasonous act. Jinnah’s statement also carries the weight of Herderian
thought where once again language is linked to the unity and strength of a nation.
In January 1952, governor-general Khwaja Nizammudin defended Jinnah’s Urdu6

The fact remains that most speakers across cities in Pakistan and North India speak a mutually intelligible language variety, often referred to by linguists as Hindi-Urdu (Rahman, 2011). In this paper, I use
Hindi-Urdu and Urdu-Hindi interchangeably to further emphasize the similarities between the two
language varieties as well as to discursively resist the tendency to order the primacy of Hindi over Urdu.
7
My reference to “Indian Muslims” indexes the identificatory label many Muslim members in the Indian independence movement used to advance the interests of Muslims in the movement. For example in
1906, a group of elite Muslims created the All-India Muslim League in Dhaka (Metcalf &Metcalf, 2006)
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only position, sparking student-led protests in Dhaka, leading to a number of
student deaths and, as some would argue, the beginnings of Bengali nationalism
(Ayres, 2009; Rahman, 2004a). Subsequently in 1955 the central government
adopted a one-unit and dual language policy8 (Ayres, 2009; Bose & Jalal, 1998). In
order to design a more inclusive governance strategy for the fledgling two-part
nation-state, the 1956 constitution9 declared both Bengali and Urdu as national
languages for East Pakistan and West Pakistan respectively, while English
remained the official language. However the imbalance between power of East
and West Pakistan persisted since the nation’s capital was in West Pakistan,
where the majority of government officials spoke Urdu, or even Punjabi, but not
Bengali. To be fair, language policy is but one aspect of the complex political,
social, and economic factors that led to Bangladesh’s eventual independence in
1971, but language issues certainly sowed the seeds of discontent in both the East
and West Wings.
The one-unit policy created an imbalance of representation within the West
Wing since Punjab had the largest population and overwhelmed Sindh, Balochistan
and Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa (Ayres, 2009). Following Bangladesh’s independence,
Pakistan’s current constitution (1973) delineates the national language as Urdu
and the official language as English; the latter was described as a temporary policy.
The 1973 Constitution was promulgated with Article 251 stating:
1.
2.
3.

The National language of Pakistan is Urdu, and arrangements shall be
made for its being used for official and other purposes within fifteen years
from the commencing day.
Subject to clause (1), the English language may be used for official purposes
until arrangements are made for its replacement by Urdu.
Without prejudice to the status of the National language, a Provincial
Assembly may by law prescribe measure[s] for the teaching, promotion
and use of a provincial language in addition to the national language.

The Constitution recognizes the need to continue English for official purposes
until “arrangements” can be made for its replacement. The writers also appreciated
the plurality of vernacular languages and left it to the discretion of provincial
assemblies to take up the matter. In both the pre- and post-partition eras, the
geographic area known as Pakistan has had a rich plurilingual environment. Nearly
every province and its spoken language(s)–Balochi and Brahvi in Balochistan, Pashto
in Pukhtunkhwa Khyber, Siraiki and Punjabi in Punjab, among others–remained
officially unrecognized in language-in-education policies, with the exception of
Sindhi in Sindh which has resumed its de jure status as a MOI. Furthermore with
more than 60 languages spoken in Pakistan, many ethnic-separatist movements
continue to center around their respective languages as a rallying cry for political
8

In 1955, the Pakistan Assembly passed a bill declaring all the areas and provinces in the West Wing
to be “one unit,” while the East Wing were a second unit. Under this bill, the provincial governments
of Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and North West Frontier Province were dissolved. Leaders hoped this
would do away with provincial prejudices and reduce administrative expenditures. The one-unit policy was dissolved in 1970 by General Yahya Khan (Bose & Jalal, 1998).
9
The Government of India Act of 1935 was used as an interim constitution by both India and Pakistan
until they wrote their own. It did not express an explicit language policy (Ayres, 2009). The 1956 Pakistani Constitution replaced this interim constitution.
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autonomy10 (cf. Ayres, 2009; Rahman, 2010a). Compared to the Bangladeshi riots
of 1971, there was a less violent reaction to the 1973 declaration of Urdu as the
national language, although regional language movements continued to resist this
imposition. These vociferous language movements have resisted the Urdu-centric
cultural practices throughout Pakistan’s history, particularly in Sindhi-speaking,
Siraiki-speaking, Pashto-speaking, and Balochi-speaking communities (Ayres,
2009; Rahman, 2002). The non-Urdu-speaking population believed the leaders
wished to suppress ethnic identity and rally the public around a constructed
national identity supplemented by an imposed single national language (Rahman,
2004b). In this sense, we see a similar language ideology to the colonial era, where
Pakistan’s leaders assume that a single national language will encourage national
unity and efficient governance. These status policy efforts to unite Pakistani
citizens under one language have been fraught with politics and conflict (cf. Ayres,
2009; Huizinga, 1994; Oldenburg, 1985; Peshkin, 1962; Shackle, 1977).
Similar to the colonial policy where English was not for all Indians but only
a selected elite, Pakistan’s education system perpetuated this division between
English-medium education for the elite and Urdu-medium education for the rest.
The ideological division along class differences continues to characterize English
speakers and non-English speakers. Rahman (2004b) argues that Pakistan’s current
educational institutions designate class along the lines of English proficiency
or lack thereof. The Pakistani elite attend English-medium education, typically
private schools and universities, while the working classes attend Urdu-medium
public schools and public universities, and the very poor and rural, mostly
male, youth attend Urdu-medium, or perhaps Arabic-medium, madrassah, or
traditional Islamic, education. Rahman explains that the educational apartheid
has made class disparities more acute and that the class-based education policies
are part of the state’s discriminatory practices against the marginalized non-elite.
Of course, many factors, other than language-in-education policy, contribute to
the state’s mismanagement of education policies and their implementation. Such
claims by Rahman and others ask that scholars devote more attention and care to
understanding the weaknesses of the current system and the complex history that
has shaped it before proposing any more programs that only exacerbate the current
dilemma while prioritizing governance and marginalizing the public’s daily
realities. Furthermore, if the majority of Pakistanis do not claim Urdu or English,
as their first language, this leads to the exclusion of “linguistic communities from
education because they do not understand the language used in school” (Coleman,
2010, p. 23). The divisive repercussions of not addressing the local communicative
practices relates to the current political instability and conflict, running contrary to
the state’s goals of good governance.
It seems that neither the British colonizers nor Pakistan’s political leaders
sought to maintain the elements of the area’s linguistic diversity in national
language policies. Perhaps similar to the Crown, the state determined multilingual
language-in-education policies would be disadvantageous for political expediency
and strategic governance. For example, in 1990 Benazir Bhutto’s government
proposed the Balochistan Mother Tongue Use bill which mandated the use of
10

According to the 1998 Census, only 7.57% of approximately 132 million Pakistanis claim Urdu as
a mother tongue, while 87.77% claim one of the following: Punjabi, Siraiki, Sindhi, Pashto, or Balochi
(Government of Pakistan, 1998).
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Balochi, Brahvi, and Pashto in public, or non-elite, schools, exempting elite English
medium schools from this language policy. However, in 1992 Nawaz Sharif’s
representative in Balochistan passed an amendment to this bill making the policy
“optional” (Ayres, 2009). The specific political reasons why these governments
disagreed over their support for Balochi language education cannot erase the
general lack of interest, commitment, and political will evident in language policies
that do not account for non-Urdu, non-English localized language practices. The
continued existence and official backing of a Macaulay-esque “class” of elite,
English speakers who are protected from the, albeit short-lived, Balochi language
policy is indicative of the continued prestige and valorization given to English
compared with any and all other languages. As discussed earlier however, despite
the official colonial language policy, there was an undercurrent of communicative
activity that led to a major political and social upheaval in the subcontinent. The
question that remains is whether current Pakistani scholars and policymakers will
continue the top-down education language policy that fails to account for locallyinformed communicative practices or if they are willing to change this paradigm.
Post 9/11 Shifts in Language Ideologies
Today, the instability of the Pakistani political infrastructure as well as geopolitical and domestic problems (i.e., the US War on Terror, extremism, corruption,
lack of adequate power resources, and yearly droughts and floods in a largely
agrarian economy) take center stage in most domestic debates. In Pakistan, where
30% of the population is said to be living in “extreme educational poverty”11 and
63% percent is under the age of 25 (UNESCO, 2010; UNDP, 2011), it is crucial that
stakeholders in both the public and private sectors address the needs of the current
educational crisis and invigorate the dialogue with fresh ideas. If more than half
of Pakistan’s population is currently under 25, the need to understand how young
people are socialized as Pakistani citizens and as global citizens takes on great
urgency. Simultaneous to the Pakistani Prime Minister’s declaration of 2011 as
the “Year of Education,” there has been a renewed interest among policymakers,
researchers, and the media to examine the existing language education programs
and policies and to suggest proposals for improving the country’s education
system (cf. Lyon & Edgar, 2010; Mustafa, 2011; Rahman, 2011).
To address these complex problems, it is useful to draw lessons from past
attempts at education policy. It almost goes without saying that the historical
events have shaped the post 9/11 moment we find ourselves in. Sociolinguists
and educationists (e.g., Ayres, 2009; Hayes, 1987; Mansoor, 1993, 2005; Rahman,
1996, 2002, 2004b) have analyzed efforts by earlier colonial and Pakistani state
governments to design language policies and have critiqued the nationalist
and religious ideologies about language informing these mandates. From a
methodological point of view, many of these studies on language programs and
policies are primarily based on textual analysis of historical documents and events
or draw from survey-based research. In other words, the bias of the research
methodology is likely to gloss over the underlying social processes taking place
in schools and universities. Without a more reflexive understanding of how we
11

UNESCO defines individuals living in “extreme educational poverty” as those with two or fewer
years of education.
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are positioned within these ideological labyrinths, it becomes difficult to remove
colonial ideologies from contemporary language policies. In this section, I analyze
current language policy discourse to understand how older language policies have
continued to influence the discourse and what is not currently being included in
the dialogue.
At the higher education level, all universities maintain a standard language
policy that instruction and assessment must be in English (Higher Education
Commission, n.d.), with the implicit assumption that English is used exclusively
for communication in classrooms and for general academic discourse. As
espoused by the Higher Education Commission (HEC), the symbolic capital of
English for non-English speakers in terms of employment and economic mobility
is well documented and understood (Mansoor, 2005; Mustafa, 2011; Rahman,
2002, 2005). In a public address to an American university audience, Rahman
(2005) explains that these individuals are “unable or unwilling to overcome the
obstacle of English to get a decent job in society”12 (p. 23). The belief that education
systems should be designed to support the market and that the development
of human capital increases a nation’s ability to participate in the global market
manifests in the priority ascribed to English medium education by many students
and families (for more on human capital theory, see Patrinos, 2000; Schultz, 1971).
The emblematic nature of English is as a means of self improvement that leads to
greater possibilities of career advancement, but more importantly it seems that
earning power is eclipsed by a correlation with secularism and democracy and an
inverse relationship with terrorism and militancy. Rahman (2005) explains:
[Pakistan] is now a frontline state helping the United States fight terrorism. At the same time its education system has the potential to create terrorists. English is relevant in this context because students who are least
exposed to it appear to be most supportive of intolerant and militant values.
(p. 3, emphasis added)

This statement presents a more recent shift in language ideology regarding
English from the historical ideology where English-speaker portended elite and
prestige status to English as an indicator of non-militancy. Rahman’s reference to
the education system having the potential of “creating” individuals who support
intolerant and militant values aligns with his earlier critique (1996, 2004b) of the
economic and social disparity produced by an educational system divided by
medium of instruction. Rahman (2005) goes on to discuss the potential implications
of English discourses within Pakistan:
English is also the window to the outside world and has discourses with
liberal, democratic values which do have the potential of changing maledominating, macho values from Pakistani traditional sub-cultures. It can
also act as a moderating influence against the influence of religious extremists who are intolerant of points of view different from their own or
of womens’ empowerment and liberation. (p. 23)

Compared to the first quote, Rahman bifurcates the English discourse into two
main perspectives: (1) the power to discourage militant and intolerant attitudes
12

I assume that “decent job” means a well-paying position.at some kind of socially acceptable establishment and/or institution.
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and (2) the possibility of a more liberalizing and moderate ethos. English use in
Pakistan now becomes associated with two kinds of English speakers who espouse
two language ideologies. One ideology references the elite English speakers,
formerly part of the interpreter class, who are “alienated from and indifferent to
the rest of their compatriots from less privileged socio-economic classes” (Rahman,
2005, p. 23). He goes on to explain that since these less-privileged compatriots are
not exposed “to any discourses created in other societies, it is easy for discourses
produced by religious fundamentalists, cultural chauvinists and others to dominate
their minds” (p. 23). Rahman (2005) explains that this bifurcation is connected to
the same two-tiered educational system where the teaching and use of English is
accompanied by the inculcation of liberal and modern values. Mahboob (2009) takes
another perspective where he explains how English in Pakistan “reflects Islamic
values and embodies South Asian Islamic sensitivities” (p. 175). While I abhor
the recent trend in the media to equate Islamic practice and extremism, I become
concerned with ideological relationships between Islamic ways of thinking and
the English language. It is imperative that researchers understand the explicit and
implicit consequences of such ideological positioning and investigate what it is that
people actually do with their English, Urdu and other communicative resources.
Rahman’s discourse seems similar to Coleman’s (2010) review of English
language teaching policies and practices in Pakistan, where Coleman acknowledges
that English has a gate keeping role and that many students of English see their
education as a means to an end. While this is not surprising, both of these authors
cannot account for the daily lived communicative English literary practices since
the focus seems to be on a top-down, social engineering agenda. Both Rahman’s
emphasis on the moderating influence of English and Coleman’s report, written
at the behest of the British Council and the Government of Pakistan to understand
the importance of English as a “tool for individual and national development”
(Wazir Ali, cited in Coleman, n. p.) embody an interest in understanding how
English can be taught to better the educational system and consequently the
sociopolitical environment in Pakistan. In a post 9/11 world, where Pakistan and
its majority Muslim population are discussed frequently in the context of the
US War on Terror, it is understandable why researchers would want to imagine
a relationship between English-medium education and non-militancy or as a
means to create a more equitable reality. Lyon (2010) takes a contrary approach
to such “education as panacea” ideology. He argues that “if educational reforms
are meant to raise national literacy...it may behove the state to comply with
community expectations, even if they may be contradictory to what an indigenous
urban minority elite or external donor may think is appropriate” (p. 17). He goes
on to propose that education reforms should not be “a disguised form of social
engineering to correct existing inequalities between genders or classes,” (p. 27) but
a more locally informed set of practices which includes community members in
the policy-making process.
The recent ideological connection in regards to English language as a modern,
secular language indexes a recycled revision of older language ideologies. English
was originally designated as the communicative medium for Macaulay’s interpreter
class, but it had a subversive role in the processes of colonial ambivalence and
became a medium through which the Indian elite propelled decolonization. In
Rahman’s statement, we see an instance where English has became ideologically
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linked to liberalism and modernity, and in opposition to extremism. Rahman
(2005) claims that those who are exposed to it, most likely through some kind of
schooling experience, may become less extremist in their thinking. Urdu speakers
are ideologically positioned in contrast to English speakers where Urdu is seen
as a non-elite language variety, void of prestige, and related to extremism. In
her survey-based study, Mansoor (1993) finds that male and female students
studying in both Urdu and English medium schools rated English speakers to be
more cultured, mannered, intelligent, educated, and capable than Urdu speakers.
Rahman (2004b) explains that English-medium students hold Urdu-medium
students in open contempt and describe them as paendoo13 [‘rustic’] as a term of
derision. He describes the English-medium students to have only one redeeming
feature: “their support for liberal-humanist values,...human rights, democracy,
and freedom” which they eventually lose when they become functionaries of
the state (p. 71). Such statements seem rife with conflicting language ideologies
and the ideological shifts, from colonial ideologies to the present, demand more
empirically grounded research to explore their significance and implications for
contemporary social and educational processes. While scholars have conducted
large and small-scale quantitative-based surveys to understand the educational
system’s deficiencies and students’ needs (Coleman, 2010; Lyon, 2010; Mansoor,
1993, 2005; Rahman, 2002), these studies have contributed to our understanding
of the needs of contemporary educational context but more qualitative research
is necessary, especially to understand the systemic reasons for the deficiencies of
the educational system and what kinds of locally contextualized language policies
would be most desirable looking forward.
Making the Case for Empirically-based Language-in-Education Policy
Finally I turn to recent national discourses concerning language education
beginning with the National Education Policy of 2009 and analyze them in
conjunction with other language policy proposals by researchers, multilateral
agencies, and Pakistani public figures. Due to the recent national attention to improve
Pakistan’s educational system, particularly given the large youth population in a
region marred by conflict, the Prime Minister, along with the UK government,
mandated a national initiative to support the implementation of the National
Education Policy (NEP) of 2009 through the efforts of the Pakistan Education Task
Force (PETF). The government recognized Pakistan’s previous failures to implement
policy and prioritizes the goals of providing greater access and raising education
quality. The PETF “signals a renewed commitment by the Government of Pakistan
to deliver on policy pledges and to be held accountable for bringing about change”
(Pakistan Education Task Force, n.d.). Item #21 of the National Education Policy
(NEP) of 2009 explains that while English is an international language necessary
for competition in a globalized world, Urdu is the language that “connects people
13

The word paendoo is etymologically related to the Punjabi word pind for a rural village or settlement. Someone who is referred to as paendoo is from a pind. While it may seem ironic that the Englishspeaking students use an Urdu word to metapragmatically reference Urdu-speakers, I propose that
this kind of cross-exchange and mixing between English and Urdu registers and sensibilities indexes
the existence of hybrid register formations known by both English-speakers and Urdu-speakers. I hope
to follow this line of reasoning in my current research projects with urban Pakistani youth and their
hybrid registers and multi-modal communicative practices
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across Pakistan and is a symbol for national cohesion and integration” (Ministry
of Education, 2009, p. 4). The policy asserts simultaneously Pakistan’s investment
in English education to compete internationally as well as its position as a modern
nation-state united by a symbolic language. Since English is described as necessary
only as far as international purposes are concerned, the Urdu (language)-as-Pakistan
ideology survives intact. The 2009 NEP highlights the need for children to learn
“English as a subject” from Class I to Class V and then stipulates that all instruction
must be in only English from Class V onwards (p. 20). The assumption is that after
taking English as a subject for four years, students will acquire enough academic
proficiency to enter English-medium schooling. How this can be accomplished in
such a short time frame in a country where English is spoken by a very small and
elite population is left unanswered. The current Educational Task Force may want
to reconsider whether it is possible, given Pakistan’s educational system’s financial
constraints and qualified instructional staff limitations, to pursue the goal of being
seen as a modern, English-speaking nation, united by a single national language.
None of Pakistan’s vernacular languages are mentioned by name in the NEP 2009,
with the exception of Urdu. These two related but seemingly incompatible goals–
to look modern while remaining united as a nation–do not adequately address the
obstacles faced by students and teachers to achieve academic success expected by
the government.
The language policy sections of the National Education Policy 2009 appear
to be a posturing rhetorical device to interested development agencies outside
of Pakistan and could arguably not manifest in any real implementation plan.
The proposal for four years of English-as-a-subject learning is not grounded in
any research study to explain why this would be sufficient for students to enter
English-medium schooling. In a longitudinal study on bilingual education
(BE) in the United States, Ramirez et al. (1991) found that regardless of the kind
of bilingual education program, whether it was a strong form of BE (like dual
bilingual education) or a weak form (like early-exit transitional BE), it took nonEnglish speaking students five or more years to acquire academic proficiency
in English. In another study, Hakuta, Butler, and Witt (2000) concluded that it
could take four to seven years for most students to attain proficiency in English,
depending on whether it was oral proficiency or included academic criteria. While
the educational programs in Pakistan and the United States are very different,
as are the national contexts, I refer to these findings to make the point that
immigrant, non-English speaking students in America take anywhere between
four and seven years to become fluent in English, and this is in a context where the
teacher, administrators, and other students are most likely fluent English speakers.
Many immigrant students in America are surrounded by examples of English
communication in their neighborhood, playgrounds, and media. The NEP 2009
is proposing that students in Pakistan, of particular concern those coming from
non-English speaking households, should be able to “pick up” English in subject
courses after four years and then go on to only English-medium classrooms.
Rahman’s dismay in the two-tiered system seems appropriate considering the
lack of empirical proof for why four years would be sufficient in a multilingual
country, like Pakistan, where students may likely be speaking two or three other
non-English languages outside of school. Coleman (2010) explains that while the
NEP 2009 extends the role of English medium instruction and the desire to reduce
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social stratification is commendable, “it does not necessarily imply that English
should be used as a medium of instruction. In fact a persuasive argument has
been made that this ‘democratising’ approach may ultimately lead to widespread
illiteracy, rather than literacy, in general and particularly in English” (p. 19).
I argue that upon analysis, it becomes clear that the NEP’s position on language
policy as a posturing device rhetorically points to the state’s interest in making
English-medium education more accessible, but without any serious political will
or intellectual commitment to the endeavor. Furthermore if Pakistani policymakers
are primarily speaking to development agencies and international audiences, the
priority given to non-localized education objectives and requirements of the global
economy seems equally evident and problematic for the Pakistani schoolchildren
and their families who will be affected by the policies. Recently several scholars
and writers have suggested proposals to address education policy within Pakistan
(Khalique, 2007; Lyon & Edgar, 2010; Mansoor 2005; Mustafa, 2011; Rahman,
2010a). Tariq Rahman (2010a) and Sabiha Mansoor (2005) argue for an additive
form of bilingual education that appreciates the linguistic diversity in Pakistan
while recognizing the utility and importance of Urdu and English competency.
Similar to Rahman (2010a), the columnist Haris Khalique (2007) argues that while
English-medium education is the official stance of public education in Pakistan,
and although Urdu is seen as a bridge to acquiring English competency, if we were
to compare the kind of English-medium education available to the elite population
through private schools to the English-medium education found in most urban
and rural public schools, we would find tremendous disparity, exemplifying a
high degree of social and class inequalities prevalent in Pakistani society.
Several Pakistani public figures have proposed that if these inequities cannot
be addressed perhaps Pakistan should do away with English-medium education
altogether (Khalique, 2007; Mustafa, 2011). This rather extreme view represents
the more ideology-based policy proposals, without enough understanding of local
knowledges and practices, circulating in the Pakistani and international media.
Mustafa (2011) proposes that the language of the home environment, or mother
tongue, be the MOI until grade 7 when it can remain the mother tongue or change
to Urdu. At the 11th grade level, students can choose either English or Urdu (p.
151). Such top-down approaches to language education are contrary to many of
the international studies on bilingual education where scholars emphasize the
importance of community and parental support to ensure bilingual education
program success (cf. Bartlett & Garcia, 2011). Neither Mustafa (2011), Khalique
(2007), nor Rahman (2010a) offer specific plans for how such national program
policies can be enacted. Many of these authors seem to be responding to language
ideology-based policies from the past often with an un-reflexive understanding of
their own language ideologies. For example, Mustafa, a Karachi-based journalist,
states that “English has become a prop for Pakistan to project itself as a state
trying to reform itself and emerge as a modern society” (2011, p. 161). In one
moment, she has ideologically linked the state’s support for English as part of
an insincere attempt to appear modern and so one wonders how the state can
genuinely make a case for support of English to participate in global markets
without seeming disingenuous.14
14

Mustafa’s (2012) comments gained international traction when she wrote a similar article titled
“Pakistan ruined by language myth” for the British online version of The Guardian newspaper.
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In contrast, Mansoor (2005) conducted an extensive mixed methods case
study on language planning in Pakistan to examine whether students received
sufficient linguistic support in Urdu, English or the mother tongue to achieve
academic success. Her work is remarkable in that, contrary to many other policy
proposals, her suggestions are grounded in an empirical study that includes the
voices of students, teachers, parents and other stakeholders. She also recognizes
that there are multiple Englishes circulating in the Pakistani educational sphere
and encourages more communicative language teaching pedagogies (such as
English for Specific Purposes (ESP), English for Academic Purposes (EAP), and
English for Science and Technology (EST)) and suggests that “overseas experts”
be consulted at all stages in developing ESP methods (p. 362). Although Mansoor
argues for a “bottom-up” approach to language planning (p. 353), her proposal for
language teaching with overseas consultants seems to undermine the possibilities
of local knowledge and participation. Such a top-down development of Centers for
English Language (CELs) may be contrary to the task of language education that
reflects the daily communicative practices in classrooms unless teachers are taught
the benefit of employing ethnographic research within their classrooms to adapt
literacy education for the specific students they teach (cf. Nabi et al., 2009; Street,
2001). It is necessary to further Mansoor’s work and explore more ethnographic
approaches to language teaching that incorporate online technologies and media.
In Emerging Issues in TEFL: Challenges in Asia, Nesi (2009) and Khan (2009) explore
how ESP pedagogy can be informed by technology and the implications for
communicative language teaching (CLT) in computer mediated communication.
Such work is indicative of an important dialogue emerging among scholars within
Pakistan, and it is imperative that these efforts continue and be relayed back to
policymaking circles at the state level and private-NGO level.
I propose that only by developing our understanding of localized
communicative practices and their associated ideologies in formal and informal
spaces of learning through more ethnographic approaches will we be able to
understand the globalized lives and nuanced realities faced by the Pakistani youth.
For example, the exponential use and popularity of cell phone technology has
helped more non-English speaking users to learn and use the Roman alphabet,
through texting in Roman Urdu or Roman Punjabi. World Bank education
specialist Michael Trucano (2011) describes pilot-research projects with local
college students to understand how text messaging services can be maximized for
educational purposes. In Pakistan, the popularity of SMS communication, which
uses the Roman alphabet, has immense implications for the diversity of Roman
Urdu, Roman Punjabi, Roman Sindhi, and the like communicative practices.
Such instances are further proof that education and language education policies
designed at the bureaucratic governmental level and passed down to classrooms
may not be meeting the needs of students, if they ever did. Mustafa remarks upon
the annoying presence of Urlish, “an ugly combination of Urdu and English,” in
Urdu TV talk shows and blames the education system for this phenomena (p. xi).
Her disappointment for the dearth of linguistic purism in classrooms where the
students may not be required to speak English outside of the school is not surprising
given that her language policy proposals are not based on classroom-based or
youth-based studies. As scholars have explained about the multiple varieties of
English present in Pakistan (Baumgardener, 1993; Mahboob, 2009; Rahman, 2004b),
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it is not shocking that multiple Urdu varieties, often spoken by the youth, exist and
that these varieties circulate in urban Pakistan through mediatized discourses. In
fact, Rahman‘s (2010b) presentation at the TEDx Lahore event, titled “Who’s afraid
of Urdish and Urdi?” demonstrates an acknowledgement of these varieties, where
Urdish references mixing Urdu and English and Urdi, a mixing of Urdu and Hindi.
However since Urdu is ideologically positioned as inferior or not useful to acquire
English competency, there has been little research on the actual Urdu communicative
practices of youth either in or out of school. In Mansoor’s (2005) study, she reports
on predominance of mixing Urdu and English in classroom practices, although this
phenomena does not inform her language policy proposals (p. 307). While there is
a negative connotation ascribed in media and scholarship about mixing language
varieties, the occurrence of such mixing can hardly be denied (Rahman, 2010b). In
my forthcoming research, I intend to explore the dynamic communicative practices
of young people through mediatized discourse to inform our understanding of
language education and language socialization, and perhaps to design a more
localized language-in-education policy.
While most of the scholars find the linguistic diversity of Pakistan to be indicative
of rich and vibrant cultures and communities, they are more hesitant to recognize
the place of the mixing of these varieties in the educational sphere. Pennycook
(2010) explains that the “current approaches to diversity, multilingualism, and so
forth all too often start with the enumerative strategy of counting languages and
romanticizing a plurality based on these putative language counts” (p. 63). But how
do we incorporate this information when it comes to language-in-education policy?
How can we address the needs of the national leaders and their strategies of good
governance with the reflexive understanding of the extent to which languages,
and their associated ideologies, are “inventions of the disciplines that make them”
(p. 64)? I propose that in order to better understand the kinds of language-ineducation policy that may benefit non-elite Pakistani students, the first step would
be to support more empirically and ethnographically informed research studies that
focus on localized and diverse communicative practices in both urban and rural
classrooms (Canagarajah, 2005). It appears premature to recommend a definitive
language policy without more critical understandings of the language ideologies
that have informed earlier policies. Rahman’s discussion (2005) about the ideologies
associated with English and Urdu since 9/11 certainly points us in the direction
where language-identity-nation cannot be thought of as fused into one synthesized
language policy. Rather, researchers must recognize the multi-dimensional
communicative repertoires of students, teachers, and families and make room for
these pluralities in the school experiences. That may mean multiple language policies
for different regions and cities, but this should not be a cause for alarm that Pakistani
students will no longer identify with a monolingual nation-state, if such a thing ever
existed. Rather a language policy that accepts and makes room for superdiverse
repertoires (Blommaert, 2011) may actually be a productive move in terms of
reducing economic instability and increasing national and regional security. If we
understand the ideologies that inform language education as socially constructed
and politically charged, then it becomes vital that we trace how these ideologies are
formed and enacted in everyday practice so that policy recommendations actually
respond directly to daily realities of the population addressed, and resist recycling
outdated colonialist language ideologies of the past.
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